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Abstract
This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to
physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemologi-
cal one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and McGinn.
On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor
epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is
semantic that the mind-body problem is a quintessentially philo-
sophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural
scientific knowledge advances.1
In recent years there has been a growing body of literature
devoted to explaining precisely why the mind-body problem has
appeared so intractable. In the light of the perceived failure to
carry out a successful reduction of the mental to the physical, a
number of philosophers have set out to explain what it is that
makes statements about mind-body identity more problematic
than scientific identity statements such as water = H2O or
lightning = electromagnetic discharge. Some, like Jackson2 and
Kripke,3 have appealed to Cartesian-style arguments that invoke
conceivability as a guide to possibility in order to demonstrate that
the identity of mind and body is metaphysically contingent.
Others, such as Nagel,4 Levine5 and McGinn6, by contrast, have
argued only in favour of epistemic non-identity. In particular,
Levine has warned against drawing metaphysical conclusions from
1 I would like to thank my colleague James Tartaglia for a number of fruitful discussions
on the explanatory gap.
2 Jackson, F., ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), pp. 291–295;
reprinted in The Nature of Consciousness, Block, E., Flanagan, O. and Guzeldere, G. (eds.),
(Cambridge, Massachussetts and London, MIT Press), 1997, pp. 567–570.
3 Kripke, S., Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell), 1980.
4 Nagel, T., ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 1979.
5 Levine, J., ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’, Pacific Philosophical Quar-
terly 64 (1983), pp. 354–361.
6 McGinn, C., ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’ in the Nature of Consciousness,
Block, E., Flanagan, O. and Guzeldere, G. (eds.), (Cambridge, Massachussetts and
London: MIT Press) 1997, pp. 529–542.
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epistemological premises and unambiguously condemned Jack-
son’s and Kripke’s metaphysical attack on physicalism by exposing
and rejecting the rationalist assumptions on which their argument
is based.
Whilst rejecting Jackson’s and Kripke’s modal rationalism,
Nagel, Levine and McGinn nonetheless concede that physicalism
is unable to account for the qualitative character of experience,
and that, whereas there may be no real distinction between the
mind and the body, there certainly is an epistemological one since
we access our mental states in a very different way from that in
which we access our physical states. In other words, even if physi-
calism were the whole story metaphysically speaking, it cannot be
the whole story epistemologically speaking because introspection
yields a technicolor phenomenology that is unaccountable from
within the objective perspective. Thus whereas for Kripke and
Jackson the gap in question is ontological, for Nagel, Levine and
McGinn it is essentially epistemological.
In this paper I explore an alternative to the metaphysical chal-
lenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the
epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine
and McGinn. On this alternative the gap is neither ontological
nor epistemological, but semantic. I will refer to the Kripke/
Jackson challenge to physicalism as the ontological thesis, to the
Nagel/Levine/McGinn challenge as the epistemological thesis,
and to my own alternative as the semantic thesis. Like the propo-
nents of the epistemic thesis, I do not endorse modal rationalism
since I share their scepticism concerning the rationalist metap-
hysics that leads Kripke and Jackson to mount a metaphysical
challenge to physicalism. But unlike the proponents of the epis-
temological thesis, I argue that what makes the mind-body
problem into a philosophical problem is not the fact that we access
mental and physical phenomena in very different ways, but the
fact that we mean very different things when we speak about the
mind and when we speak about the body. I claim that it is because
the gap is semantic in nature that the mind body-problem is a
quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to simply
wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances.
On the semantic thesis the philosophical problem of the rela-
tion between mind and body is firmly connected to a conception
of philosophy as a disambiguating activity that enables us to
discern different senses even where there is only one referent. A
supporter of the semantic thesis is therefore primarily committed
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to the ineliminability of the analytic/synthetic distinction, rather
than to the ineliminability of two modes of epistemic access:
introspection of the inner world and inspection of the outer one.
For this very reason it is not possible to accommodate a dual
aspect theory that construes the gap in semantic (rather than
epistemological) terms within a naturalistic framework, since the
semantic thesis that is defended here is closely connected with
a conception of philosophy as first science. In this respect the
semantic thesis differs drastically from the epistemological thesis.
Most supporters of the epistemological thesis are physicalists
who detect an epistemological lacuna in the method of natural
science. Nagel, for instance, claims not that physicalism is false,
but that ‘we do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it
might be true’.7 Similarly, for Levine, it is the capacity of physical-
ism to explain the phenomenal character of experience that is at
stake, not its truth. The epistemological thesis is therefore not
intended as a challenge to physicalism in the way in which the
metaphysical thesis clearly is. For Nagel and Levine, physicalism is
actually true, but it just leaves certain aspects of our experience
unexplained. This incipient naturalism is clearly revealed in
McGinn’s work, where the epistemological thesis first developed
by Nagel and Levine provides the basis for a deflationary
approach to the philosophical problem of mind-body dualism.8
McGinn, like Nagel and Levine, begins by noting that there is
something that the objective perspective leaves out, namely the
qualitative element, that answers to the question ‘what is it like to
be an X?’. For McGinn the problem of mind-body dualism arises
because we are cut off by our very cognitive constitution from
achieving a conception of that natural property of the brain (or
of consciousness) that accounts for the psycho-physical link.
This is a kind of causal nexus that we are precluded from ever
understanding, given the way we have to form our concepts and
develop our theories. No wonder we find the problem so
difficult!9
7 Nagel, T., ‘What it is Like to be a Bat’, p. 177.
8 More recently McGinn has articulated this position in Consciousness and its Objects
(Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press), 2004.
9 McGinn, C., ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’ in The Nature of Consciousness,
p. 529.
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McGinn then adds that the fact that we are cognitively closed with
respect to the natural property that accounts for the psycho-
physical link entails ‘there is no philosophical (as opposed to
scientific) mind-body problem’.10
The semantic thesis developed here effectively undermines
McGinn’s deflationary approach to the problem of mind-body
dualism. I intend to show, first, that the mind-body problem is a
philosophical problem, and second, that the problem persists not
because of some kind of cognitive inability on the part of human
beings to grasp the psycho-physical relation, but because of the
peculiar, i.e., purely semantic, nature of the mind-body distinc-
tion. To clarify the point: my claim is not that there is no episte-
mological gap as such, but that it is the existence of a semantic gap
that makes the mind-body problem into a recurrent philosophical
problem. Thus, whereas reformulating the mind-body gap in
semantic terms does not entail denying that there is a distinctive
phenomenology that is inadequately accounted for from an objec-
tive perspective, it does entail shifting the focus away from a
consideration of the qualitative character of experience to a
reflection on the meanings of assertions which employ the con-
cepts of mind and body.
The argument that I advance here is a reconstruction of the
account of philosophical analysis that Collingwood developed in
An Essay on Philosophical Method (EPM)11 a book that contains what
is arguably the most powerful explanation in the twentieth
century of why philosophy has a distinctive subject matter that
differs from that of the sciences of nature. My goal is to elaborate
on Collingwood’s account of the role and character of philosophi-
cal analysis to explain why the mind-body problem persists.
I should make it clear at the outset that it is not the purpose of
this paper to defend an exegetical thesis. I can easily envisage
a number of prima facie reasons why readers with more than
a passing acquaintance with Collingwood’s work may doubt
whether some of the claims discussed here are Collingwood’s
own. For the purpose of this paper I am happy to concede that I
have taken up one of Collingwood’s ideas and freely developed it
in my own way.12 In the following I explain, first, why philosophi-
10 Ibid, p. 531
11 Collingwood, R. G., An Essay on Philosophical Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1933.
12 For a fuller account of EPM see my Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience,
(London and New York: Routledge), 2002. For Collingwood’s engagement with the mind-
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cal problems are semantic in nature, and second, I explore the
implication of this claim for the mind-body problem.
In order to discover what constitutes a peculiarly philosophical
problem we must begin from the fact of philosophical practice.
And when we do consider the practice of philosophy we find that
there are indeed problems that recur again and again, problems
such as that concerning the compatibility of free will and deter-
minism or the criteria for personal identity. In An Essay on Philo-
sophical Method Collingwood provided an ingenious explanation as
to why these problems exist and subsist. We can get a grip on why
philosophical problems exist at all only if we are willing to
concede that there are non-empirical concepts and that there are
non-empirical distinctions.
What is an empirical classification and what are its features?
Collingwood claimed that the coordinate species of an empirical
genus form mutually exclusive classes. Take for instance the
empirical genus “colour” and its coordinate species “red” and
“blue”. The objects which fall under the concept “red” cannot fall
under its coordinate species “blue” since no object can be both
red and blue at the same time. Take, as another example, the
empirical genus “mammal” and its coordinate species “cow” and
“goat”. The objects which fall under the concept “cow” cannot fall
under that of “goat”. The coordinate species of this genus, there-
fore, form mutually exclusive classes. In other words, the coordi-
nate species of an empirical genus cannot be extensionally
equivalent. Philosophical distinctions differ from empirical classi-
fications in that they allow for extensional overlap: the coordinate
species of a philosophical genus form mutually overlapping
classes. Let us consider three examples of philosophical distinc-
tions, one which belongs to moral philosophy, one which belongs
to aesthetics and one which belongs to the philosophy of mind.
Moral philosophers are used to distinguishing between actions
which are performed from the motive of duty and actions which
are performed from prudential considerations. But the philo-
sophical distinction between the principle of duty and that of
utility is not an empirical classification since some actions which
exemplify the motive of duty could also be carried out on the basis
of consequentialist considerations. In Kant’s Groundwork, for
body problem, see also ‘Collingwood’s “Solution” to the Problem of Mind-Body Dualism’,
Philosophia 32 (2005), pp. 349–368 and ‘Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind’, Inquiry 48
(2005), pp. 395–412.
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example, the action of the shopkeeper who returns the correct
change in order to retain his custom is performed on the basis
of prudential considerations, but it outwardly conforms to the
demands of morality and could equally be used to illustrate the
principle of duty. The principle of duty and that of utility, there-
fore, allow for extensional overlap, although such overlap is ruled
out in the case of empirical classifications. Another example of a
philosophical distinction is that between kinds of art such as music
and poetry. Whereas empirical classes cannot overlap, music and
poetry can be jointly instantiated in, say, a Bob Dylan song. Whilst
a thing cannot be both red and blue, a cow and a goat, it can be
both music and poetry at the same time. Analogous consider-
ations are relevant to the kind of distinctions at work in the
philosophy of mind, such as the distinction between persons and
bodies. The distinction between persons and bodies is not
advanced as an empirical classification that subdivides existing
entities into non-overlapping classes in the way in which the sub-
division of higher primates into chimpanzees and humans is
intended to do. The distinction between persons and bodies is a
semantic distinction and as such allows for extensional overlap.
The task of philosophy, as Collingwood puts it, is ‘the distinguish-
ing of concepts . . . coexisting in their instances’.13 It is in this way
that philosophers distinguish between the principles of duty and
of utility, between aesthetic genres such as music and poetry, and
between persons and mere bodies even when there are no empiri-
cal classifications corresponding to such distinctions. Let me now
turn to consider two objections that might be raised against Col-
lingwood’s account of how philosophical distinctions differ from
empirical classifications.
It may be argued that overlap of classes is not a distinctive
feature of philosophical concepts since empirical concepts too
allow for extensional overlap. The concepts of “having a beak”
and “having feathers” are empirical concepts. Yet they overlap in
their instances, i.e., in birds. Empirical overlap of this kind is
ubiquitous but such an objection may be quickly answered by
pointing out that “having a beak” and “having feathers” are not
coordinate species of the same empirical genus. They are rather
like the concepts of “brown” and of “wool” which indeed coexist
in this brown woollen jumper, but which are not supposed to
13 R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 51.
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capture an important juncture in nature in the way in which the
classifications of vertebrates into mammalian and oviparous crea-
tures and of mammals into cows and goats are intended to do.
Further, whereas we can find partial overlap in empirical con-
cepts, as in the case of “brown” and “wool”, or “animals with a
beak” and “animals with feathers”, the coordinate species of philo-
sophical concepts in principle allow for complete extensional
overlap, since philosophical distinctions are purely intensional
distinctions that one would want to make even where there are no
extensional differences. Thus moral philosophers would want to
distinguish between the principle of utility and that of duty even
in a hypothetical scenario where virtue really promoted happiness
and the duty/utility distinction made no difference to the action
one has to perform. To elucidate what is meant by a purely
intensional or semantic distinction we might take a moment to
reflect on what happens when such distinctions are not drawn.
The implications of the failure to make the relevant semantic
distinctions can be gleaned from considering some of the prob-
lems encountered by Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle, as is well
known, did not clearly distinguish between virtue and happiness.
The concept of eudaimonia, which covers both, is not a composite
concept made up of heterogeneous elements; it is an homoge-
neous whole in which virtue and happiness have no independent
conceptual existence. Thus, for Aristotle, the virtuous person also
enjoys a prosperous life from a non-moral point of view, just as
those who fail to distinguish between the concept of love and that
of jealousy automatically assume the jealous man to be a man in
love. To have the concept of eudaimonia requires not making, but
failing to make the distinction between moral and non-moral
kinds of goodness. In order to operate with the concept of eudai-
monia we have to make not more, but fewer conceptual distinc-
tions. The Kantian critique of Aristotle’s moral philosophy
amounted precisely to introducing a distinction that Aristotle did
not make between categorical and hypothetical imperatives in
order that we could consistently entertain the thought that virtue
may go unrewarded. Kant certainly did not intend the distinction
between actions undertaken out of the principle of duty and those
undertaken for instrumental reasons to be an empirical classifica-
tion. As we saw, the concept of duty and that of utility may overlap
in their instances, as in the case of the action of the shopkeeper.
But it is only because the distinction is made at all that it is also
possible to think, contra Aristotle, that virtue may not be advanta-
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geous in an empirical sense. Progress in philosophical enquiry
often occurs through the introduction of semantic distinctions
which resolve problems created by their absence. The introduc-
tion of semantic distinctions, such as the one between the prin-
ciple of duty and that of utility, is a very different matter from the
discovery of another species of human, such as Homo floresienses,
the hobbit-like creature found to live on an island east of Bali
between Asia and Australia. The introduction of a philosophical
distinction does not entail the addition of an empirical class that
was previously unknown, but a refinement of our understanding
of what it means to be good and in what different senses an act can
be said to be good. Philosophical distinctions enable us to identify
a thing as a particular kind of thing, as say, a morally worthy action
as distinct from a prudential action or a rational as distinct from a
non-rational being. But the kinds singled out by the coordinate
species of a philosophical genus may correspond to no empirical
kinds since philosophical distinctions do not ‘cut nature at the
joints’, but bring out what we mean when we speak of a moral
rather than an immoral action, of a person rather than a mere
body etc.
Let us now consider a second objection to the doctrine of the
overlap of classes. A more powerful counter-example to the claim
that the coordinate species of philosophical concepts, unlike
those of an empirical genus, allow for extensional overlap,
however, might seem to lie in the existence of hybrids such as
Tyrannosaurus Rex. For some time a dispute has raged amongst
palaeontologists which were divided as to whether T Rex was a
predator or a scavenger. The dispute was fierce because it was
assumed that being a predator or being a scavenger were coordi-
nate species of the same empirical genus and that they therefore
captured an important juncture in the natural world. The dispute
however was ultimately settled by claiming that T Rex was both a
predator and a scavenger, thereby suggesting that overlap of
classes is not a distinctive feature of philosophical concepts. But
even the surprising way in which this dispute was ultimately
resolved does not cast serious doubt on the claim that philosophi-
cal distinctions differ in kind from empirical classifications
because the doctrine of the overlap of classes entails that there
strictly speaking are no ‘examples’ of philosophical concepts. The
action of the shopkeeper illustrates what it means to act on pru-
dential considerations; it is not an example of a prudential action
in the way in which Dolly is a specimen of a sheep. Since there are
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strictly speaking no examples of philosophical concepts, the par-
ticulars in which the coordinate species of a philosophical genus
coincide are not hybrids: philosophical concepts simply are not
jointly instantiated in the way in which empirical concepts are.
Thus, if we say of human beings that they jointly instantiate the
concepts of body and mind, we do not mean that the human
being is partly body and partly mind in the way in which a centaur
is partly horse and partly human. As Collingwood puts it:
. . . man’s body and man’s mind are not two different things,
but the same thing . . . as known in two different ways. Not a
part of man, but the whole of man is body in so far as he
approaches the problem of self-knowledge by the methods of
natural science. Not a part of man, but the whole of man is
mind, in so far as he approaches the problem of self-knowledge
by expanding and clarifying the data of reflection.14
Since the objects which exemplify more than one philosophical
concept are not hybrids, the overlap of classes does not pose the
same problem for philosophical distinctions as it does for empiri-
cal classifications. When philosophers encounter concepts that
coincide in their instances, they do not assume that the thing to
do is to rearrange their conceptual scheme. The natural reaction
of philosophers is to find ways of retaining semantic distinctions
even when they make no empirical difference. This, for instance,
is how Berkeley’s immaterialist turn sought to deal with the dis-
tinction between real and imaginary objects. What he claimed was
not that we ought to forsake the distinction between real and
imaginary objects, but that we should draw it in a different way,
that what we call a distinction between real and imaginary objects
is in fact a distinction between ideas which are more or less lively,
more or less orderly and more or less coherent. When philoso-
phers encounter distinctions that coincide in their instances, their
natural reaction is not to abandon them, but to find a way of
preserving and reformulating them.
So far we have considered three philosophical distinctions, one
in moral philosophy, one in aesthetics and one in the philosophy
of mind, and argued that philosophical distinctions are qualita-
14 R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1942, revised edn. 1992),
p. 14.
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tively different from empirical classifications because the former
express purely semantic distinctions. Philosophical disputes ad-
dress semantic questions (e.g., what does it mean to be a person
rather than a body?) and opposing positions in philosophical
debates (like duty-based ethics versus consequentialism in moral
philosophy, causalism versus non-causalism in the philosophy of
action) do not carve up reality along the lines of empirical kinds,
but along the lines of distinctions of reason.
This conception of the nature of philosophical problems casts
a very different light on to the mind-body problem. As we have
seen, in contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind the
mind-body problem is regarded as a somewhat special issue that
arises from the fact that mental and physical states are accessed in
very different ways. The meta-philosophical views just discussed do
not see the mind-body problem as a special kind of problem since
they regard the mind-body distinction as similar to other purely
intensional distinctions found in other branches of philosophy
such as ethics and aesthetics. Thus, on this account of the origin
of philosophical problems, the persistence of the mind-body
problem is not due to the epistemological fact that mental states
are accessed in very different ways from bodily states. The mind-
body problem arises because the mind-body distinction is a
semantic distinction rather than an empirical classification; it
persists because there are claims that are true in virtue of meaning
and as such they cannot be falsified in the light of emerging
empirical evidence. There is a philosophical mind-body problem
and it is here to stay, at least for those who are reluctant to
relinquish the analytic/synthetic distinction.
The implications of the claim that the mind-body distinction
is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic, are far
reaching and spelling them out would necessarily go far beyond a
discussion of the literature most closely associated with the debate
concerning the explanatory gap. Two brief considerations,
however, may be offered by way of conclusion.
First, denying that the mind-body distinction is epistemological
in favour of the semantic thesis entails that knowledge of the
psycho-physical relation is not so much beyond our cognitive
grasp as irrelevant to our understanding of mind. It is irrelevant
because the concept of mind is logically required in order to
identify any given particular as mental. An investigation into the
neurophysiological basis of consciousness involves the application
of a causal explanation and thus of a category that is intrinsically
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unsuitable to describe the mental qua mental. If there is no sci-
entific solution to the mind-body problem, this is not because we
are unable to comprehend how type physicalism might be true,
but because causal explanations of the emergence of conscious-
ness, even if they could be found, are simply not explanations
of mind.
Secondly, denying that the mind-body distinction is ontological
in favour of the semantic thesis entails endorsing a particular view
of the nature of metaphysical disputes. On this view, metaphysical
disputes are not about what really exists but about the categorial
structures we employ to identify what there is: metaphysics is
ultimately a form of conceptual analysis. This view of the mind-
body problem as an essentially semantic problem thus rests on an
identification of the task of philosophical analysis with that of
conceptual clarification that bears some similarities to the linguis-
tic turn. Yet whilst the semantic thesis identifies metaphysical
analysis with conceptual analysis, it does not endorse the view,
often associated with Ryle and Wittgenstein, that philosophical
problems are pseudo-problems which will wither away, not as a
result of scientific advances, but of conceptual clarification.15 It is
the very fact that we keep on making semantic distinctions, or
distinctions to which there correspond no empirical differences,
that explains why the mind-body problem has withstood the test of
time and why there will always be a need for philosophical analy-
sis. The semantic thesis is thus neither an attempt to solve the
problem empirically (or to explain why the scientific solution,
whilst in principle possible, is beyond our comprehension), nor is
it a deflationist attempt to dissolve the problem a priori. It is an





15 On this see ‘Collingwood and Ryle on the Concept of Mind’, Philosophical Explorations
VI (I), 2003, pp. 18–30 and ‘Collingwood on Philosophical Knowledge and the Enduring
Nature of Philosophical Problems’, The British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12:1, 2004,
pp. 93–109.
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